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DUTIES, DISCLOSURE, AND DISCORD: 
NECESSITY TO RESOLVE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
AND CERTAINTY LEIDOS COULD HAVE 
CLARIFIED FOR LITIGATION STRATEGY 
AND RISK ALLOCATION 
DAMIAN P. GALLAGHER* 
ABSTRACT 
Securities litigation is a complex, specialized, and detailed 
practice of the law that depends on the expertise of courts and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. From its inception, the securi-
ties laws, namely the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, provided a baseline expectation and pre-
scription for the Securities and Exchange Commission to promulgate 
rules to fulfill the organic statute’s demands. Through time, technol-
ogy, and the law generally, the securities laws have expanded 
significantly, not only asking, but also requiring, the courts to 
answer questions never contemplated by the original drafters of the 
laws to guide this industry. 
 This Note purports to explain the outcome of a case the 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer the reach 
of a promulgated regulation. Namely, whether Item 303 of Regula-
tion S-K permits a Rule 10b-5 action for securities fraud through 
omitted statements. Because the parties themselves dismissed the 
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lawsuit before the Supreme Court could actually answer the ques-
tion, based on the circuit split and the Supreme Court’s current 
jurisprudence and outlook with the securities laws, this Note will 
suggest the impact Leidos could have had on the industry and 
the implications generally. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Without a doubt, the securities industry presents new prob-
lems for litigators to evaluate, argue, brief, and present new solu-
tions. Time has only brought more questions, and as the courts 
attempt to answer these questions, it only leads to more ambiguities 
and subsequent follow-up questions. 
 After a traumatic economic crash and the tragedy of the 
Great Depression, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 
(Securities Act), and later the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(Exchange Act),1 which created the Securities Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC). The Acts permit the SEC to promulgate rules to carry 
out the agency’s purpose.2 While the Acts cover a wide range of 
prohibitive activities and lawsuits, Section 10(b) of the Exchange 
Act is the applicable section that prohibits insider trading.3 Under 
the authority of Section 10(b), the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 
to fulfill the statute’s mission.4 
 It is clear that corporate insiders or individuals who have 
access to inside information have affirmative duties to disclose 
trades on such information or to abstain from trading from infor-
mation; failure to comply with these duties can result in prosecu-
tions under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for fraud, insider trading, 
or both, by the SEC or the Department of Justice.5 In other cases, 
courts have extended liability in cases where there is a material 
omission.6 This seems counterintuitive because, ordinarily, a failure 
to act does not trigger liability in the common law regime.7 So 
                                                                                                             
1 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended 
by 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2010)) [hereinafter Exchange Act]. 
2 The SEC has described its mission “to protect investors, maintain fair, 
orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.” Additionally, 
the SEC was created in 1934 “to enforce the newly-passed securities laws.” 
U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, What We Do (June 10, 2013), https://www.sec 
.gov/Article/whatwedo.html [https://perma.cc/3AAM-TCU4]. 
3 Exchange Act § 78j. 
4 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1951). 
5 See In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 901, 908 (1964). 
6 William Shotzbarger, Business and Friendship Don’t Mix: The Government’s 
Expansion of Insider Trading Liability Under SEC Rule 10B5-2, 65 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 579, 580 (2015) (discussing the SEC’s expansion of confidential relation-
ships that could give rise to liability for insider trading). 
7 Michael Corrado, Is There an Act Requirement in the Criminal Law?, 142 
U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1532 (1993–94) (discussing how American law generally 
requires an affirmative act for criminal liability). 
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how can someone violate the law by failing to act or even provide 
uncertain information? Violating the law in this scenario is more 
likely than one would imagine. 
 In Leidos, the Supreme Court of the United States granted 
certiorari to answer just this question: “[w]hether the Second Cir-
cuit erred in holding—in direct conflict with the decisions of the 
Third and Ninth Circuits—that Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K 
creates a duty to disclose that is actionable under Section 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5.”8 Leidos 
effectively offered the opportunity to answer whether Item 303 
created an additional actionable duty under Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5.9 
 Previous scholarly work has addressed the circuit split that 
would later be granted certiorari by the Supreme Court.10 Further, 
“it is clear that harmonizing holdings in Stratte-McClure and Cohen 
into a single coherent legal principle does not stretch limits of logi-
cal possibility.”11 This premise perfectly illuminates the opportunity 
that Leidos could have offered had it not been dismissed under 
Supreme Court rules. 
 This Note aims to assess the parties’ arguments in Leidos, 
which the Supreme Court would have addressed had it ruled on 
the merits of the case. Part I will discuss the essential statutory 
background in the securities law world, including necessary provi-
sions, the growth of Rule 10b-5, and the normative policy argu-
ments that guide the federal securities laws.12 Moreover, it will 
evaluate Item 303 and Private Shareholder Litigation suits. Schol-
arly discussion on Item 303 and the interplay of Rule 10b-5 and 
private enforcement actions will further set the stage for Leidos.13 
Part II tackles a potential holding where the various iterations 
                                                                                                             
8 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys., 137 S. 
Ct. 1395 (2017) (No. 16-581). 
9 Id. 
10 See Brian Currie, Note, Much Ado About Nothing: The Limits of Liability 
For Item 303 Omissions and the Circuit Split That Never Was, 8 WM. & MARY 
BUS. L. REV. 379, 404–05 (2017) (finding that there never actually was a circuit 
split because the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit “based their decisions 
upon similar readings of the same cases,” and “[it] seems that [the split] is 
merely a story of a circuit court split that simply never existed—but created a 
stir nonetheless”) (alteration in original). 
11 Id. 
12 See infra Part I. 
13 See infra Part I. 
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of the cases are described in detail to vet out the factual and legal 
background behind the cases.14 Subsequently, Part III articulates 
both the Petitioner’s and Respondent’s arguments on the question 
granted for certiorari.15 With this background, Part IV fleshes 
out the various Circuit Court of Appeal opinions that create the 
circuit split outlined in the Petitioner’s and Respondent’s argu-
ments.16 Part V will attempt to assess what the Supreme Court 
could have held were the case not dismissed.17 Finally, the Con-
clusion catalogues the impact that a ruling in Leidos could have in 
the securities law world.18 Policy arguments will be framed around 
a chilling effect on disclosure, better market pricing for the fun-
damental value of stocks, litigation cost analytics in private 
plaintiff suits, and finally, an assessment of risk allocation and 
litigation certainty. 
I. ESSENTIAL STATUTORY BACKGROUND AND 
SECURITIES LAW PROVISIONS 
 In order to understand Leidos, it is integral to understand 
the securities law landscape, statutes, and applicable rules that 
give rise to duties. This Part will first provide a detailed assess-
ment of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. Second, this Part 
will unravel Rule 10b-5, the elements to bring such an action, 
and some scholarly commentary on Rule 10b-5 generally. Third, 
this Section will scrutinize Regulation S-K’s Item 303, the provi-
sion’s language, SEC commentary, and additional information to 
truly comprehend the disclosure requirement. Subsequently, Part I 
will explain the nature of private shareholder litigation when in 
reference to Item 303. 
 Both the Securities Act of 193319 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 193420 were designed to combat fraud and protect 
investors generally after the catastrophic stock market crash in 
                                                                                                             
14 See infra Part II. 
15 See infra Part III. 
16 See infra Part IV. 
17 See infra Part V. 
18 See infra Conclusion. 
19 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77(a) et seq. (2012)). 
20 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) et seq. (2012)). 
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1929.21 While the 1933 Act certainly is important, it only applies to 
the purchase of securities, whereas the 1934 Act applies to the 
purchase or sale of securities.22 Section (b) of the Exchange Act 
prohibits entities: 
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security registered on a national securities exchange ... any ma-
nipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention 
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe 
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors.23 
 Based on an initial reading, even scholars generally recog-
nize that the provision is not clear in what it proscribes.24 Be-
cause there is an apparent lack of legislative history or rather, the 
record is not sufficient to allow scholars to glean meaning,25 scholars 
have ascertained that Section 10(b) has two conceptions.26 The 
“Prevailing Conception” comes from the Supreme Court’s narrow 
construction of Section 10(b)’s language and prohibition of broad 
prosecuting power.27 The article cites to the Supreme Court’s read-
ing of Section 10(b) in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,28 which relied 
on “any manipulative device or contrivance” as a necessarily broad 
proscription instead of enumerated devices in order to “fulfill the 
                                                                                                             
21 See Securities Act of 1933, INVESTOPEDIA (2018), https://www.investope 
dia.com/terms/s/securitiesact1933.asp [https://perma.cc/SY62-HUA4] (stating 
that the 1933 Act was designed to protect purchasers of securities on the primary 
market through well-designed prospectuses and sufficient financial information to 
make well-informed decisions). 
22 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2)(3) (2018). 
23 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2010). 
24 See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act., 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 386 (1990) (“It would be very hard to define 
exactly what section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 forbid. It is surely impossible to say 
in a nutshell.”). 
25 Id. at 388 (“Although the Court had declared that the history of section 
10(b) supports its [narrow] reading, it usually added that section 10(b) has 
almost no history.”). Their notes that the Supreme Court has discussed the 
legislative history in footnote 15. Id. (discussing Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 
690 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201–06 (1976); Blue 
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975)). 
26 Id. at 386. 
27 Id. 
28 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202 (1976). 
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objectives of the Exchange Act.”29 The Court then limited the 
broad language to certain cases of “misconduct involving deception, 
misrepresentation, or nondisclosure.”30 Steve Thel’s “Alternative 
Conception” is the 1934 Act’s concern for securities pricing since 
the Act considers “several critical factors affecting prices includ-
ing production and dissemination of information that might affect 
prices, the flow of money into and out of the market, and the basic 
structure of the securities market.”31 But regardless of the histo-
ry used to support either conception, the individuals who debate 
which conception prevails all seem to agree that the “Act con-
ferred open-ended rulemaking authority on the SEC.”32 
 One thing is clear with regard to Section 10(b): the SEC 
promulgated Rule 10b-5 as a result of the statute’s language.33 
Rule 10b-5 makes it: 
[U]nlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce ... (a) to 
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) to make any 
untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made ... not 
misleading, or (c) to engage in any act ... which operates or 
would operate as fraud or deceit upon any person ....34 
 With the securities statutory landscape explained, the ques-
tion before the Court, here, is about Regulation S-K and Item 
303.35 Regulation S-K largely handles the filing of nonfinancial 
statements in accordance with the prescribed securities laws and 
SEC Interpretive Releases.36 The regulation states that this sec-
tion is concerned with registrant’s future projections.37 When 
management makes such projections, they must have a “good faith 
                                                                                                             
29 Thel, supra note 24, at 387. 
30 Id. at 388. 
31 Id. at 391 (“The theme that ties the Act together is a concern with secu-
rities prices.”). 
32 Id. at 394. 
33 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951). 
34 Id. 
35 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys., 
137 S. Ct. 1395 (2017) (No. 16-581). 
36 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(a) (2019). 
37 Id. § 229.10(b) (“The Commission encourages the use in documents ... of 
managements projection of future economic performance that have a reason-
able basis and are presented in an appropriate format.”). 
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assessment” of the foreseeable performance and also “have a rea-
sonable basis for such an assessment.”38 The regulation emphasizes 
the importance of communicating clearly to the investor, especially 
with previous projections: 
With respect to previously issued projections, registrants are re-
minded of their responsibility to make full and prompt disclosure 
of material facts, both favorable and unfavorable, regarding their 
financial condition. This responsibility may extend to situations 
where management knows or has reason to know that its pre-
viously disclosed projections no longer have a reasonable basis.39 
 Broadly speaking, Regulation S-K is predicated on the 
importance of providing transparency to the investor.40 Or more 
simply, the regulation is investor-focused. 
 The broad intentions and prescriptions of Regulation S-K aid 
the understanding of Section 229.303, which is commonly referred 
to as Item 303.41 Item 303’s title refers to “[m]anagement’s discus-
sion and analysis of financial condition and results of operations” 
(usually simplified as MD&A).42 The regulation is predominantly 
concerned with five areas of management’s disclosure: liquidity, 
capital resources, results of operations, off-balance sheet arrange-
ments, and tabular disclosure of contractual obligations.43 For 
transparency’s sake, the regulation requires for management to 
“[d]iscuss [the] registrant’s financial condition, changes in finan-
cial condition and results of operations.”44 
 Objectively, Item 303 imposes affirmative requirements with 
which managers must comply.45 For example, the registrant must 
                                                                                                             
38 Id. § 229.10(b)(1). 
39 Id. § 229.10(b)(3)(iii). 
40 Id. § 229.10(b)(1) stating: 
[t]he Commission also believes that investor understanding would 
be enhanced by disclosure of the assumptions which in manage-
ment’s opinion are most significant to the projections or are 
the key factors upon which the financial results of the enterprise 
depend and encourages disclosure of assumptions in a manner 
that will provide a framework for analysis of the projection. 
41 Id. § 229.303. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. § 229.303(a)(1)–(5). 
44 Id. § 229.303(a). 
45 Id. 
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report “any unusual or infrequent events or transactions or any 
significant economic changes” that could have a material impact 
on reported income.46 Further, the regulation requires registrants 
to “[d]escribe any known trends or uncertainties” that the regis-
trant would reasonably believe to have a material impact on net 
sales and revenues.47 Largely, the burden rests with the regis-
trant to make decisions that could be tangentially related.48 
 These forward-looking statements have been conceptualized 
in the academic community.49 Even with the clear statutory lan-
guage, “at first blush the regulation seems to require disclosure 
of all forward-looking information; the use of the word ‘known’ 
operates purportedly as a distinction for disclosures grounded in 
current knowledge and purely predictive disclosures.”50 Setting 
aside the elements of a securities fraud private cause of action, it is 
unclear to courts “whether all required Item 303 disclosures are 
material under the federal securities laws.”51 
 Scholars have tried to answer this very question of mate-
riality and whether Item 303 violations are sufficient for the ele-
ments to be pleaded.52 Claiming that Item 303 does not cross the 
materiality threshold required by case law (see Basic v. Levinson53), 
Matthew Ady believes that there are real litigation hurdles for 
Item 303–based causes of action.54 One such barrier is the lack 
of recovery for speculated damages coupled with “strict standards 
                                                                                                             
46 Id. § 229.303(a)(3)(i). 
47 Id. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii). 
48 Id. § 229.303(a) (“Where in the registrant’s judgment a discussion of segment 
information and/or of other subdivisions (e.g., geographic areas) of the registrant’s 
business would be appropriate to an understanding of such business, the discus-
sion shall focus on each relevant, reportable segment and/or other ... as a whole.”). 
49 See Brian Neach, Note, Item 303’s Role in Private Causes of Action Under 
the Federal Securities Laws, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 741, 741 (2001) (“Stated 
simply, a ‘forward-looking statement’ in the context of securities law represents a 
statement ‘describ[ing] events or activities that will occur, if at all, at some future 
date.’” (quoting James D. Cox et al., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS (2d ed. 1997))). 
50 Id. at 744. 
51 Id. at 752. 
52 See Matthew Ady, Living in a Material World: Does a Violation of Item 
303 of Regulation S-K Satisfy the Materiality Element in a Rule 10b-5 Cause 
of Action?, 17 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 401, 403 (2017). 
53 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 249–50 (1987). 
54 Ady, supra note 52, at 433. 
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set by PSLRA and the Supreme Court ....”55 While private causes 
of action may be limited for plaintiffs, the author does note that the 
SEC can still circumvent the 10b-5 action by way of a mere Item 
303 violation.56 By analyzing studies evaluating the necessary 
threshold of what percentage would be necessary for “reasonably 
likely,” Ady quite simply states “Item 303 would mandate disclosure 
of that uncertainty.”57 
 Other scholars take a less measurable approach to mate-
riality and instead focus on the implications of failing to effec-
tively litigate Item 303 violations.58 Such shortfalls result in less 
information being available to investors, less efficient markets, 
and less informed investment decisions.59 While encouraging more 
enforcement of Item 303 as private 10b-5 causes of action, Suzanne 
Romajas claims and supports the notion that “the SEC’s general 
position [is] that not all forward-looking information must be dis-
closed.”60 The SEC has taken steps through interpretive releases 
to explain what the Item 303 standard is for MD&A; however, 
“the standards for disclosure, particularly as they relate to forward-
looking information, remain uncertain.”61 
II. SPLIT CIRCUITS AND SETTING THE STAGE FOR LEIDOS 
 Part of the Supreme Court’s essential calculus for granting 
certiorari is the existence of a circuit split. “A conflict among the 
circuits is probably the most important criterion for the grant of 
certiorari.”62 Such splits are often viewed as troubling.63 This Part 
                                                                                                             
55 Id. at 433–34. 
56 Id. at 434 (“Pursuant to the Exchange Act, the SEC may impose a civil fine 
on companies that violate Item 303, and it often does.”). 
57 Id. at 429. 
58 See Suzanne J. Romajas, Note, The Duty to Disclose Forward-Looking Infor-
mation: A Look at the Future of MD&A, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 245, 247 (1993). 
59 Id.  
60 Id. at 257. 
61 Id. at 286. 
62 Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: The Supreme Court, the 
Ninth Circuit, and the Congress, 77 OR. L. REV. 405, 431 n.130 (citing H.W. Perry, 
Jr., Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States Supreme Court, 
100 (1991)). 
63 Id. at 431 (“[C]ircuit splits are unseemly and unsettling because at least 
two panels of learned judges have come to opposite conclusions on a legal point. 
Although lawyers may thrive on the absence of a clear rule, the public perception 
may be that the system is irrational and unfair.”). 
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aims to walk through the split between the Second Circuit, the 
Third Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit, focusing on the legal analysis 
behind the split. Specifically, this Part focuses on emphasizing the 
factual distinctions made in the Second Circuit’s analysis of Regula-
tion S-K because it was the Circuit Court that drew attention to 
the split. 
A. The Second Circuit 
 In Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, the Second Circuit 
held, as a matter of first impression, “that a failure to make a 
required Item 303 disclosure in a 10-Q filing is indeed an omis-
sion that can serve as the basis for a Section 10(b) securities 
fraud claim.”64 Arriving at such a conclusion, the Second Circuit 
recognized that generally, “[s]ilence, absent a duty to disclose, is 
not misleading under Rule 10b-5.”65 But while this common law 
concept does not impose liability absent a duty to disclose, Item 
303 imposes an affirmative duty to disclose in Form 10-Qs, and 
fraud in these filings can constitute fraud under Section 10(b).66 
The Second Circuit noted that “[w]e have already held that failing 
to comply with Item 303 by omitting known trends or uncertainties 
from a registration statement or prospectus is actionable under 
Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.”67 Citing 
Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, the Second Circuit 
pointed out that the language tracks similar verbiage in Rule 10b-5, 
which requires disclosure of “material fact[s] necessary in order 
to make ... statements made ... not misleading.”68 By virtue of the 
requirement that entities use affirmative disclosure of informa-
tion to avoid making registration statements and filings misleading, 
the court ascertained that “omitting an item required to be disclosed 
on a 10-Q can render that financial statement misleading.”69 
Further, the court grounded its reasoning that an omission can be 
as misleading as affirmative statements because these disclosures 
“give investors an opportunity to look at the registrant through 
                                                                                                             
64 776 F.3d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 2015). 
65 Id. at 100–01 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.7 (1988)); 
see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980). 
66 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 101. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 102. 
69 Id. 
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the eyes of management by providing a historical and prospec-
tive analysis of the registrant’s financial condition and results of 
operations.”70 Since Item 303 and disclosures generally offer in-
vestors an opportunity to assess the registrant, such an investor 
“would interpret the absence of an Item 303 disclosure to imply 
the nonexistence of ‘known trends or uncertainties ....’”71 
 The court proceeded, stating that sustaining an omission 
claim under Item 303 will only prevail under Rule 10b-5 if the 
omission would be “material” under the Rule.72 This requires the 
private plaintiff bringing the action to demonstrate that the defend-
ant failed to meet Item 303’s requirements.73 Then, the plaintiff 
must show that the defendant had such a duty to disclose the 
omission under Item 303, followed by a showing that the omission 
was material.74 
 The Second Circuit forwardly recognized that its conclu-
sion—that an omission under Item 303 could give rise to liability—
is incompatible with differing conclusions in the Ninth and Third 
Circuits.75 The Second Circuit addressed the Third Circuit’s con-
fusing standard in Oran,76 which some courts believed it to hold 
that an Item 303 omission “does not automatically give rise to a 
material omission under Rule 10b-5”77 and clarified that the Third 
Circuit actually held that Item 303 could give rise to a material 
10b-5 omission standard.78 The Second Circuit determined that 
the Third Circuit’s holding is consistent with its opinion in the 
fact “[a]t a minimum, Oran is consistent with our decision that 
failure to comply with Item 303 ... can give rise to liability under 
Rule 10b-5 so long as the omission is material ....”79 
 In applying the legal standard it deemed appropriate for 
omissions under Item 303, the Second Circuit affirmed the District 
                                                                                                             
70 Id. (citing Exchange Act Release No. 6835, 1989 SEC LEXIS 1011). 
71 Id. (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii)); see also Donald C. Langevoort 
& G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under Rule 10b-5, 57 VAND. 
L. REV. 1639, 1680 (2004). 
72 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 102. 
73 Id. at 103. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 288 (3d Cir. 2000). 
77 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103 (quoting Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 
275 (3d Cir. 2000)) (emphasis in original). 
78 Id. at 103 (emphasis in original). 
79 Id. at 103–04. 
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Court’s dismissal of the claim because of plaintiff’s pleading short-
comings.80 However, the court, addressing the merits, also found 
that the defendants did breach the duty imposed by Item 303 
because the defendant (Morgan Stanley) faced a deteriorating mar-
ket and failed to disclose future trading losses “that would mate-
rially affect the company’s financial condition.”81 Morgan Stanley 
rebutted plaintiff’s claim that its Item 303 disclosure was inade-
quate with the fact that Morgan Stanley did, in fact, disclose in 
reference to deterioration of positions in other markets.82 But the 
court found that the disclosure trends were “generic,” “spread out,” 
and “unconnected to the company’s financial position.”83 The 
court reiterated the SEC’s expectation and Item 303’s imposition 
that disclosures include both a “discussion” and an “analysis” to 
be sufficient.84 
 As such, the Second Circuit held that omitted information 
fails to comply with the demands of Item 303 and this constitutes 
an actionable fraud suit.85 This holding, different from the Ninth 
Circuit below, widens the circuit split that gave rise to Leidos.86 
Should the Supreme Court side with the Second Circuit approach, 
the court which has been referenced as the “Mother Court” for secu-
rities,87 then liability would be greatly expanded through omitted 
information that an investor would reasonably want to know. 
B. The Ninth Circuit 
 The Ninth Circuit, in NVIDIA Corp., held that Item 303 
did not create a duty to disclose under the applicable statutes at 
play.88 The court grounded its reasoning in the required duties 
                                                                                                             
80 Id. at 106. 
81 Id. at 104. 
82 Id. at 105 (“[D]isclosing the deterioration of the real estate, credit, and sub-
prime mortgage markets, and its potential negatively to affect Morgan Stanley.”). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii)). 
85 Id. at 107. 
86 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3–4, Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret. 
Sys., 137 S. Ct. 1395 (2017) (No. 16-581). 
87 See generally James D. Zirin, The Mother Court: A.K.A., the Southern Dis-
trict Court of New York, ABA (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org 
/groups/young_lawyers/publications/tyl/topics/legal-history/the-mother-court-aka 
-southern-district-court-new-york/ [https://perma.cc/8LJC-QN39]. 
88 In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1055 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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that typically give rise to a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5.89 Essentially, relying on established principles, the court 
asserted that liability under the applicable statutes can only arise 
“from an omission in contravention of an affirmative legal dis-
closure obligation.”90 In the ordinary application of the law, the 
court noted that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not create such an 
obligation “unless omission of that information would cause oth-
er information that is disclosed to be misleading.”91 
 The court proceeded to address the plaintiff’s citation to 
Simon v. American Power-Conversion Corp., a case in which the 
judge found that Item 303 does create an affirmative duty to 
disclose and that the defendant’s failure to disclose created an 
actionable claim.92 However, the Ninth Circuit noted that the 
judge in Simon later clarified his opinion, writing that “[a]s this 
Court noted in Simon, the disclosure rules are probative of what 
defendants are otherwise obliged to disclose but do not, themselves, 
provide an independent duty of disclosure.”93 The court then con-
cludes, on the same case, that a plaintiff cannot rely on an Item 
303 omission to prove that a defendant’s omitted information was 
material.94 The court concluded that Item 303 “does not create a 
duty to disclose for purposes of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5” and 
that a separate duty must be shown through principles in Basic 
and Matrixx Initiatives.95 
 The Ninth Circuit recognized and was “persuaded by [Oran’s] 
reasoning” in ascertaining the proper ruling on an Item 303 omis-
sion giving rise to a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.96 
The court was persuaded by the varying tests required in Item 
303 and the materiality principles established in Basic.97 Noting 
                                                                                                             
89 Id.  
90 Id. at 1055–56 (quoting Panther Partners v. Ikanos Comm., Inc., 681 
F.3d 114, 120 (2d Cir. 2012)). 
91 Id. at 1056 (citing Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 
43 (2011)). 
92 Id. (referencing Simon v. Am. Power Conversion Corp., 945 F. Supp. 416 
(D.R.I. 1996)). 
93 Id. (quoting Kafenbaum v. GTECH Holdings Corp., 217 F. Supp. 2d 238, 
249 (D.R.I. 2002)). 
94 Id. 
95 Id.  
96 Id. at 1054. 
97 Id. at 1055. 
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that Item 303 requires more disclosure than what Basic requires, 
“what must be disclosed under Item 303 is not necessarily required 
under the standard in Basic.”98 The court proceeded to adopt the 
Oran ideology that an Item 303 material omission does not cer-
tainly give rise to a 10b-5 violation.99 
C. The Third Circuit 
 The Third Circuit’s Oran decision affords a closer relation-
ship to the holding of the Ninth Circuit than the Second Circuit 
case, but equally complicates the circuit split.100 “[T]he ‘demon-
stration of a violation of the disclosure requirements of Item 303 
does not lead inevitably to the conclusion that such disclosure would 
be required under Rule 10b-5. Such a duty to disclose must be sepa-
rately shown.’”101 The court tried to wrestle between the compet-
ing statements offered in traditional 10b-5 analysis and the SEC’s 
interpretation of Item 303.102 Noting that the SEC’s interpreta-
tion of Item 303 “varies considerably from the general test for 
securities fraud materiality set out by the Supreme Court in Basic, 
Inc. v. Levinson[,]” the court was nevertheless convinced that the 
materiality requirements for a 10b-5 action do not give deference to 
a presumption that an Item 303 shortcoming establishes actionable 
fraud.103 Convinced by the findings in the SEC’s discussion that 
“[d]isclosure is then required unless management determines 
that a material effect on the registrant’s financial condition or 
results of operations is not reasonably likely to occur[,]” the court 
asserted that “SK-303’s disclosure obligations extend considera-
bly beyond those required by Rule 10b-5.”104 
                                                                                                             
98 Id. 
99 Id. (quoting Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 288 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
100 Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 288 (3d Cir. 2000). 
101 Id. at 288 (quoting Alfus v. Pyramid Tech. Corp., 764 F. Supp. 598, 608 
(N.D. Cal. 1991)); see also In re Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., 123 F.3d 394, 402 
(6th Cir. 1997); Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 1996); In re 
Quintel Entertainment, Inc., Sec. Litig., 72 F. Supp. 2d 283, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); 
Wilensky v. Digital Equip. Corp., 903 F. Supp. 173, 181 n.10 (D. Mass. 1995), rev’d 
in part on other grounds sub nom; Kriendler v. Chemical Waste Management, 
877 F. Supp. 1140, 1157 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
102 Oran, 226 F.3d at 287. 
103 Id. at 288. 
104 Id. at 287–88. 
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Thus, the Third Circuit effectively held that violating Regula-
tion S-K’s Item 303 “does not automatically give rise to a material 
omission under Rule 10b-5.”105 
D. Thoughts on Which Circuit Got It Right 
 Each Circuit’s approach has its virtues and vices. Without 
getting too mired in the thoughts on which the courts’ opinions 
were predication and, perhaps, the political underpinnings of the 
courts themselves, it would seem that the Supreme Court would 
prefer the Second Circuit approach. This makes sense for a few 
practical reasons. First, the Southern District of New York and the 
Second Circuit handle a large amount of securities-related actions. 
Not only is a Regional Office of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission stationed in New York City, but these enforcement ac-
tions along with private enforcement actions are tried and appealed 
regularly in these courts.106 Practically, the courts that frequently 
adjudicate these matters would be in the best position to deter-
mine the law. Further, the Second Circuit approach construes the 
securities laws liberally, which is both a common statutory in-
terpretation approach and policy decision.107 
 On the other hand, the Third and Ninth Circuit are re-
served in expanding liability.108 Private parties would prefer this 
reading of Regulation S-K. It is more predictable and does not 
force companies to over-disclose in fear of litigation. 
 What might lend more insight to this inquiry are the ar-
guments put forth by the Petitioner and Respondent for the Leidos 
case. 
                                                                                                             
105 Id. at 288. 
106 See Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? 
(The Same Way Everybody Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities 
Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 85 n.6 (2002) (“Instead, the real experts 
are the district court judges in the districts in New York ... who see securities 
fraud cases as a routine matter.”). 
107 See Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 99–100 (7th Cir. 1997); 
Goodman v. Epstein, 583 F.2d 388, 410 (7th Cir. 1978) (“To effectuate the broad 
remedial purpose of the federal security laws, they are to be construed liberally 
and flexibly.”) (referencing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)); Daniel 
v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1231 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. 
granted, 434 U.S. 1061 (1978). 
108 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 10, Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys., 
137 S. Ct. 1395 (2017) (No. 16-581). 
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III. THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
 In the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, the question pre-
sented was “[w]hether the Second Circuit erred in holding—in direct 
conflict with the decisions of the Third and Ninth Circuits—that 
Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K creates a duty to disclose that 
is actionable under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5.”109 
A. Petitioner’s Arguments 
 In its Brief for a Writ of Certiorari,110 the Petitioner framed 
the question presented with an emphasis on whether Item 303 
created a newly enforceable duty under Rule 10b-5 in order to find 
that no such actionable duty exists.111 Petitioner argued first, that 
Item 303 of Regulation S-K does not create an actionable duty 
for private class action suits and second, that policy considera-
tions are insufficient arguments to impose liability based on the 
securities laws’ “text and structure.”112 
 Petitioner’s first argument relies on Basic v. Levinson’s 
assertion that “[s]ilence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading 
under Rule 10b-5[ ]”113 and thus does not create a private cause 
of action.114 The Court has only recognized an actionable duty in 
two situations. First, where there is an affirmative duty not to mis-
lead.115 So, for an omission to be actionable, as stated by Matrixx 
Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano,116 that omission must make an 
affirmative statement misleading.117 “A pure omission—where 
no statement is made at all—is not actionable.”118 Second, when 
                                                                                                             
109 Id. at i. 
110 In more than one way, the arguments have been simplified to the ex-
tent necessary to provide the most substantive and legally relevant facts for a 
discussion later in this Note. For any further reference or clarity, evaluate the 
Petitioner’s brief as cited within this Section. 
111 Brief for Petitioner at i, Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. 
1395 (2017) (No. 16-581). 
112 Id. at 14, 17. 
113 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 224 n.17 (1988). 
114 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 111, at 14. 
115 Id. at 15 (citing Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 n.18 (1987), and 
the “duty not to mislead”). 
116 Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 44–45 (2011). 
117 Id. at 44. 
118 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 111, at 15. 
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a relationship of trust and confidence exists, there is a fiduciary 
duty to disclose.119 
 In cases where the Court has recognized enforceable duties, 
“[it] has found an actionable disclosure duty in only two scenarios, 
and both involve something more than an omission itself.”120 As 
previously mentioned, the first variety is supported by Section 
10(b)’s text and common law fraud principles, which is a duty to 
not mislead because “[t]he focus remains on the statement, not 
on the omission.”121 The Petitioner emphasized the notion that 
this variety of duties or obligations requires affirmative misrep-
resentations and “does not encompass the type of ‘pure omissions’ 
alleged by [Respondents] here.”122 
 Petitioner cited to cases, including Basic, opining this founda-
tional concept of the securities industry, but further emphasized 
the context in the private action through Congress’s enactment of 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).123 Peti-
tioner stated that when Congress enacted PSLRA, it adopted 
Rule 10b-5(b)’s assertion that omissions can become actionable “only 
if an affirmative statement is rendered misleading.”124 The PSLRA 
codified a very limited set of misleading statements: just false 
statements amounting to half-truths as well as typical affirma-
tively misleading statements.125 Further, Petitioner not only argued 
that Plaintiff-Respondents failed to specify how      each state-
ment could be misleading (a statutory requirement under the 
PSLRA126), but also succinctly contended, “[a] pure omission 
claim cannot satisfy the PSLRA’s” pleading necessities.127 
 Petitioner’s second argument, relying on the fiduciary duty 
to disclose, rested on the understanding stated in Chiarella128 
                                                                                                             
119 Id. (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980)).  
120 Id. at 20 (emphasis in original). 
121 Id. at 21 (citing Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 n.18 (1987), and In 
re Vivendi, S.A. Sec. Litig., 838 F.3d 223, 240 (2d Cir. 2016)). 
122 Brief for Petitioner at 21–22, Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys., 137 S. 
Ct. 1395 (2017) (No. 16-581). 
123 Id. at 24. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980) (holding that “a duty 
to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic 
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that relationships of trust and confidence create a duty to either 
disclose or abstain from disclosing.129 A derivation of common law 
fraud, caveat emptor, this duty created an obligation to disclose 
material nonpublic information to insiders before trading, or oth-
erwise, abstain from acting on such information.130 The Court has 
permitted such a dealing to arise through legal obligations or 
courses of dealing other than a duty to comply with the federal 
securities antifraud principles.131 
 After recognizing that the duties applicable to private 
rights of actions are limited in these two contexts, the Petitioner 
stated that the Second Circuit erred by creating an actionable 
third duty.132 This third duty permits an action through a “regis-
trant’s silence where Item 303—or presumably any of the Com-
mission’s thousands of other disclosure requirements—allegedly 
mandates that the information be disclosed.”133 Essentially, Pe-
titioner argued that the Second Circuit expanded the statutory 
proscription in both section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 “well beyond 
the boundaries established by Congress to include a liability 
theory that no court of appeals had held was actionable before 
the PSLRA was enacted.”134 The Petitioner grounded this argu-
ment in statutory language as well as the fact that it is the 
Commission’s responsibility to execute securities laws through 
enforcement proceedings, not private actions.135 
                                                                                                             
market information”). There, the Court found that a financial-services printing 
company employee who discerned merging parties and profited from such 
knowledge was precluded from enforcement because he owed no duty of trust 
and confidence to the parties with whom the information was about. 
129 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 111, at 25–26. 
130 Id. at 26 (citing case discussion on difference between applying pure omis-
sions between 10b-5(a), 10b-5(b), and 10b-5(c), finding that 10b-5(a) and (c) 
required something more than just a pure omission). 
131 Id. at 27 (citing Dirks v. SEC, 462 U.S. 646, 665 (1983), and noting that 
there, there was no prior dealing with the target company to create an ac-
tionable duty). 
132 Id. at 27–28 (“This case involves neither duty. The operative complaint 
specifies no statement in the March 2011 10-K that was rendered misleading 
by the omission of the CityTime fraud; and SAIC had no fiduciary-type duty 
to disclose this information to aftermarket investors. That should have been 
the end of the § 10(b) analysis.”). 
133 Id. at 28. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 28–29. 
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 Among the statutory and legal support that Petitioner cited, 
Petitioner also substantiated its argument through public policy 
rationale.136 Its policy arguments included: an impediment to the 
current disclosure regulation regime through private enforcement 
actions and the fact that it would also encourage hindsight-
driven litigation.137 
 By implication from the Brief, the SEC has an interest in 
managing its disclosure requirements, and it has particular in-
tentions when it enacts regulations (like S-K): “[t]he Commission’s 
goal has been to make Item 303 a vehicle for meaningful disclo-
sure.”138 Additionally, “[p]rivate enforcement of Item 303 pure 
omissions ... would affirmatively incentivize registrants to flood 
the market with immaterial and premature disclosures.”139 “[I]nves-
tors would be buried ‘in an avalanche of trivial information.’”140 
This would lead to poorer decision making, could reduce incentives, 
and also reduce market participation generally.141 Registrants 
would over-disclose to avoid litigation, which would “engender 
market confusion or competitive losses that justified withholding 
the information in the first place.”142 
 On the point of hindsight-driven litigation, Petitioner argued 
that PSLRA was prescribed specifically to manage the private suits, 
and concerns of consistently filed litigation were even included in 
the House Reports.143 The third duty from the Second Circuit, 
Petitioners argued, would permit expanding litigation for plain-
tiffs “even without alleging a misleading statement or the reason 
why the statement is misleading, as expressly required by the 
PSLRA.”144 And if legitimized with Item 303, the holding could 
be expanded for the “thousands of separate and distinct reporting 
requirements.”145 Such a holding, if constitutionalized and set 
for precedent, could harm the legitimacy of the SEC to do its work 
                                                                                                             
136 Id. at 41. 
137 Id. at 47–48. 
138 Id. at 42–43. 
139 Id. at 44. 
140 Id. at 45 (quoting Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1987) (internal 
citations omitted)). 
141 Id.  
142 Id. at 47. 
143 Id.  
144 Id. at 48. 
145 Id. at 49. 
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through its disclosure regime and even complicate the SEC’s work 
for updating the requirements it seeks to enforce.146 
B. Respondent’s Arguments 
 This Section aims to dissect and explain Respondent’s ar-
guments submitted to the Supreme Court. In some aspects, the 
arguments are simplified for the purposes of this Note, and for 
further analysis, please review the brief in its entirety.147 
 The Respondent, expectedly, framed the question presented 
so as to create a duty through omission.148 The argument Respond-
ent presented is twofold. First, by omitting required information as 
dictated by Regulation S-K, the issuer in fact engages in a decep-
tive action.149 Second, permitting liability through deceptive omis-
sions actually advances Congress’s favored practice of disclosure.150 
 Respondent substantiated its first argument that omissions 
are deceptive by claiming that annually required information is 
material and that omitting that information is deceptive through 
the statutory language of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.151 “As its 
text demonstrates, [section] 10(b) broadly prohibits the use of 
‘any ... deceptive device or contrivance.’”152 As Respondent noted, 
investors rely on annually filed reports and “can be led to believe 
(incorrectly) that the omitted facts do not exist ....”153 Thereby, 
investors are accepting the annual report as facially valid and as 
“a truthful depiction.”154 By relying on the statutory language, 
Respondent further cited to Omnicare,155 noting that in assessing 
                                                                                                             
146 Id. 
147 See generally Brief for Respondent, Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys., 
137 S. Ct. 1395 (2017) (No. 16-581). 
148 Id. at i (“Whether an issuer of publicly traded securities that deceptively 
omits from a securities filing material information required to be disclosed under 
Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K violates [section] 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5.”). 
149 Id. at 21. 
150 Id. at 45. 
151 Id. at 21. 
152 Id. at 21–22 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)). 
153 Id. at 22. 
154 Id. 
155 See generally Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. 
Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318 (2015). 
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whether a fact is material depends on the perspective of a reason-
able investor.156 The Respondent asserted that “‘if a registration 
statement omits material facts about the issuer’s inquiry into or 
knowledge concerning a statement of opinion, and if those facts 
conflict with what a reasonable investor would take from the 
statement itself, then [the applicable section’s] omissions clause 
creates liability.’”157 In essence, Respondent tried to articulate 
that a similar approach should be applied here because investors 
assess statements from registrations as true or, at the very least, 
as forthright representations of the company’s current state.158 
 Much of the Respondent’s argument relies on the assertion 
that by deliberately omitting material information as required 
by the SEC’s disclosure regime, such omissions are deceptive.159 
This argument is substantiated by several facts that the Respond-
ent pointed to: investors’ expectations that frequent filings are 
required by the SEC, the filing’s cover page including the SEC’s 
name, and certifications by the executive officers.160 Due to inves-
tors’ reliance on such filings, omitted information is deceptive.161 
Respondent then provided an example that if executives failed to 
disclose a criminal proceeding against one of them, the reader would 
assume that no such proceeding is actually happening, thus making 
the failure to disclose deceptive.162 Respondent then makes its 
argument, in regard to Item 303 and MD&A, that it is such an 
important section for investors because it provides investors the 
opportunity to evaluate the registrant and make informed deci-
sions.163 Here, the Petitioner’s MD&A was sixteen pages and aims 
to provide analyses of trends or uncertainties to the extent that they 
would have “a material impact” on the registrant and if anything is 
                                                                                                             
156 Brief for Respondent, supra note 147, at 22 (citing Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. 
at 1327). 
157 Id. (citing Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1329).  
158 Id. at 23–24.  
159 Id. at 23. 
160 Id. at 23–24. 
161 Id. at 24 (“The omission of required information from an annual report is 
deceptive when it leads investors to the erroneous conclusion that material omit-
ted facts do not exist.”). 
162 Id. (citing Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty 
to Disclose Under Rule 10b-5, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1639, 1680 (2004) (suggesting 
that “deliberate omissions” have the “potential to mislead”)). 
163 Id. at 25–26. 
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not disclosed, “a reasonable investor would assume that no uni-
dentified trends or uncertainties exist.”164 If an issuer is in fact 
aware of uncertainties that would be material and chooses to 
omit it from the MD&A, as required by Item 303, then “its delib-
erate omission of that required information is deceptive” and this 
“falls within [section] 10(b)’s prohibition of any ‘deceptive device 
or contrivance.’”165 
 Respondent then proceeded to analyze the deliberate omis-
sion in the context of Rule 10b-5 and found that it satisfied each 
of Rule 10b-5’s prongs.166 
 Second, Respondent asserted that companies have no such 
right to deceive investors by omitting information.167 Respondent 
challenged Petitioner’s characterization of “pure omissions[,]” 
since Petitioner rebutted its own argument by filing a report 
designated to comply with the SEC’s regulations.168 Petitioner, 
in 2011, filed as a “risk factor” that future prospects would suffer 
by relying on government contracts, and later, for this suit, omitted 
the fact for CityTime having a similar effect.169 Respondent plainly 
stated “[t]hat is deception, not ‘pure omission.’”170 Respondent 
further assessed Petitioner’s argument that the Court’s previous 
“fiduciary-type duty” cases never involved issuers and stated simply 
that in those cases, the defendants were strangers to the issuers 
and as such, “generally had no obligations to disclose infor-
mation to investors.”171 Those cases relied on finding a duty of 
trust and confidence, which later triggered a duty to disclose or 
                                                                                                             
164 Id. at 26. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 27–29 (The court proceeds to analyze the remaining elements of a 
10b-5 action. First, the omission would satisfy the materiality prong because a 
reasonable investor would want to know about that decision (most of the time for 
securities cases, its understood that a material fact is any fact that would affect a 
reasonably prudent investor) because the omission would be one of many material 
facts. Next, coupled with the scienter to withhold that information, it would satisfy 
the statute’s requirement that the disclosure omits information that would consti-
tute “both a ‘device, scheme, or artifice to defraud’ and an ‘act, practice, or 
course of business’ that ‘operates ... as a fraud or deceit.’” (citing 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b-5(a), (c))).  
167 Id. at 30.  
168 Id. at 31. 
169 Id. (emphasis added). 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 32. 
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abstain from trading.172 Respondent distinguished typical duties 
as just described from issuers’ duties by the fact that issuers 
“are the object of the 1934 Act’s disclosure regime.”173 As such, it 
could not be within Congress’s intent when it passed the statute 
to carve out an exception for issuers when the facial purpose of 
the 1934 Act was to, in effect, prevent issuers from deceiving 
through nondisclosure.174 
 Respondent’s final contention, that omissions constitute 
deception, was that the PSLRA does not limit the scope of decep-
tion as Petitioner would have the court believe, since “Petitioner 
misread the statute.”175 The provision that Petitioner cited (15 
U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1))176 applies only to certain private actions, but 
“[t]hat provision contains no language suggesting an intent to 
cover all possible theories of private liability.”177 A private plain-
tiff can satisfy the law’s provision by specifying the statements that 
were misleading and why omitting that information was mislead-
ing.178 The fact that a material fact was omitted is not sufficient 
for a plaintiff to recover since a plaintiff must also prove decep-
tion.179 “[M]eaning that the failure to disclose required infor-
mation was misleading under the circumstances.”180 Plaintiffs must 
further prove materiality, reliance, scienter, loss causation, and 
finally, damages; by proving all of the necessary elements, then, 
plaintiffs can enforce section 10(b)’s and Rule 10b-5’s “prohibi-
tion on deception and fraud, not Regulation S-K.”181 
 The Respondent’s second argument on appeal was that 
enforcing liability through deceptive omissions advances Con-
gress’s intent because permitting the Petitioner’s argument 
would in fact undermine the SEC’s ability to deter future fraud-
ulent conduct.182 
                                                                                                             
172 Id. 
173 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(2) (“‘[e]very issuer ... reports’ as the Com-
mission requires[.]”)). 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 39. 
176 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1). 
177 Brief for Respondent, supra note 147, at 40. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at 44–45. 
180 Id. at 45. 
181 Id. (emphasis added). 
182 Id. 
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 Finally, Respondent argued that the federal courts pos-
sess the judicial economy to handle the fraud claims that may 
come as a result of ruling in its favor.183 Respondent noted that 
Petitioner’s policy arguments do not sufficiently frame the legis-
lative purpose.184 Congress, in passing the 1934 Act, had a clear 
intention and it “serves the ‘fundamental purpose’ of implement-
ing ‘a philosophy of full disclosure.’”185 Respondent asserted that 
Petitioner’s argument would “undoubtedly strip the Commission 
of power to police the type of fraud at issue here.”186 The “falsity” 
element of proving fraud would effectively render the Commis-
sion’s job difficult since it had previously used Item 303 as a basis 
for liability.187 
IV. LIKELY SUPREME COURT HOLDING AND ANALYSIS 
 This Part presents a potential holding for Leidos had the 
Supreme Court ruled on the merits. Before reaching such conclu-
sions, this Part will address existing scholarly works on Item 
303 as well as Leidos generally. The considerations examined in 
the works will aid in formulating a likely holding. 
A. Articles Relating to the Leidos Argument 
 There are scholars, like Matthew Turk and Karen Woody, 
who truly believe that there was not, in fact, a circuit split, ren-
dering Leidos as an illusory securities law obscurity.188 They even 
believe that aside from the Second Circuit declaring that there 
was a circuit split, the Second and Ninth Circuits are actually in 
“full agreement.”189 Turk and Woody find that the actual reason-
ing between the circuit split rests on two misunderstandings: 
first, that a duty to disclose, in and of itself, “does not establish a 
set of conditions that may ‘trigger’” disclosures under Item 303 
                                                                                                             
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. (quoting Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1640 n.1 (2017)). 
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and Rule 10b-5;190 and second, that the duty that Leidos might 
address matters only in the insider trading context, rendering it 
less than ground-breaking.191 Referencing judicial “analytical 
gymnastics,” the authors find that Item 303 omissions could give 
rise to liability.192 However, liability would only extend “provided 
that the Basic standard of materiality is met.”193 Further, the 
authors bolster their propositions by observing that regulations in 
the securities industry have “developed in an extremely fragmented 
and piecemeal fashion” since the founding of the United States’ 
securities laws.194 Similarly, the authors note that cases like this, 
i.e., an evaluation of duties and disclosure requirements, tend to 
illustrate how opinions are formed and construed.195 Simply put, 
the authors found that there was no disparity to resolve because 
courts were just conflating two different standards.196 The au-
thors find that a failure to comply with Item 303 could offer ac-
tionable fraud claims, but not necessarily in every case.197 Finally, 
the article did leave the idea that Leidos will, one day, insist 
that “the Court ... confront an intractable disagreement over how 
much disclosure firms are required to provide to investors under 
federal law.”198 The authors believe such questions can be an-
swered with a proper understanding of the securities disclosure 
regime requirements.199 
 The authors were correct that the Court would need to 
answer this question of whether omissions are viable actions under 
Regulation S-K and when the Supreme Court granted certiorari, 
they thought so too.200 But the authors are underwhelming in how 
they classify the split. It is not a mere difference of standards or 
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approaches. Unique to the securities laws, compared to other 
laws, is the fact that securities laws are built on both statutory 
and common-law grounds. Because of this, as the authors refer 
to “fragmented” is more reason for the Supreme Court to answer 
disparities.201 Additionally, the authors grounded their analysis 
on the notion that because these are in the insider trading con-
text of the securities laws, that the analysis would not necessarily 
apply for widespread disclosure duties.202 Again, this analysis 
seems underinformed to the extent that the securities laws have 
a great deal of overlap both in doctrine and in application. Sources 
of the laws as mentioned are versed and because of this, they can 
be applied in the insider trading context, private fraud actions, 
SEC 10b-5 actions, in the criminal context with the appropriate 
culpability, and so forth. So, it does not follow that because these 
cases and facts under the split are perhaps different that the Su-
preme Court should not answer the question as a matter of cer-
tainty for litigants. 
B. The Likely Holding 
With the circuit split, the various academic takes on the 
outcome, and the parties’ arguments before the Supreme Court, 
it leaves the momentous time for how the Supreme Court would 
actually rule in this matter uncertain. Simply recapping, the Su-
preme Court has a few options before it to choose. The Second 
Circuit suggests that material omissions can give rise to liability.203 
The Ninth Circuit purports that Item 303 does not create a duty 
to disclose otherwise omitted information.204 The Third Circuit, 
favoring a “cousin” to the Ninth Circuit’s holding, does not totally 
preclude liability since an omission “does not lead inevitably to 
the conclusion” that a disclosure would be required.205 With these 
three options, the circuit split, how would the Supreme Court of 
the United States rule? 
 If this question was easily answerable, not only would time 
and money be saved, but years of litigation would be avoided. 
The difficultly in this question lies not only in how the Supreme 
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Court would hold, but also the approach and rationale to get there. 
Law school demonstrates the breadth of holdings and the disparity 
of how and when Justices act when they do. So, it is worth men-
tioning the many ways the Court could approach the case. 
 Second, the Supreme Court could use tools and theories of 
statutory interpretation to ascertain the promulgated regulation’s 
meaning. Here, the Court would evaluate the ordinary meaning of 
the text, look at dictionaries, legislative history, and understand the 
underpinnings of the regulation. The Court would have its clerks go 
through the comments submitted before promulgation to ascer-
tain a specific intent behind the statute. 
 Third, and perhaps finally, the Court would take a practical 
approach to the question. Arguably, the Court will evaluate the 
repercussions of a holding one way or the other. Justices may rely 
on their own notions of what the law should be or how Congress 
likely wished it to be carried out, square it with practicalities, and 
then reach a decision. 
 There is reason to believe, and for sake of this Note, to 
rely on the submitted briefs from the parties (and included herein). 
This may tie to the practical effects just described. But at the core 
of this matter is litigation exposure. The two ends, really between 
the Second and Ninth Circuits, are ones of liability. Regulation 
S-K will either expose individuals to sweeping liability through 
material omissions, or else it will continue to create liability through 
affirmatively misleading statements. Given the current composi-
tion of the Supreme Court (and all other matters equal: agency 
deference afforded under Administrative Law, Statutory Interpreta-
tion, Federal Courts, and topics beyond the scope of this Note), the 
Supreme Court would likely rule on the side of the Ninth Circuit. 
 While the Second Circuit is termed the Mother Court and 
while there is reason to construe the securities laws liberally, what 
is perhaps most telling is that the SEC promulgated Regulation 
S-K.206 The SEC, the chief agency tasked with the securities laws, 
would know whether they wanted to expand liability and simply 
could have said so. Further, the Regulation pertains to manage-
ment discussion and analysis by definition. The broad purpose of 
this is to discuss the on-goings of the company. While this Note 
does not discuss safe harbor provisions for companies, it seems 
counterintuitive to hold that omissions (mindful that they must 
                                                                                                             
206 17 C.F.R. § 229.10 (2018). 
284 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:255 
be material ones) could give rise to liability when the analysis is 
tasked with discussing the current status. Simply, if the section 
deals with disclosure, the Court may be less suspect to omissions. 
Finally, as fleshed out in Part V below, there would be disparate 
effects if the Supreme Court held in favor of the Second Circuit. 
V. IMPACT LEIDOS COULD HAVE HAD AND SIGNIFICANCE 
IN THE SECURITIES REGIME 
 This Part intends to develop the implications that Leidos 
could have had. Whether the Supreme Court ruled in favor of 
creating an additional actionable duty under Item 303 or found 
that no such duty was formed, there surely would be implications. 
This Part will first analyze if the ruling would have any sort of 
chilling effect when it comes to disclosures generally. It will as-
sess whether affirmative statements or omissions can create more 
(or perhaps fewer) opportunities for litigation. Subsequently, this 
Part will ascertain whether permitting Section 10(b) suits could aid 
in better market pricing on shares’ fundamental value. Since this is 
an age consistently concerned with litigation strategy and cost anal-
ysis, this Part will then develop arguments for plaintiff decision-
making. Finally, this Part will explore risk allocation generally 
in reference to stock price accuracy and individual assessment. 
 First, there would likely be a chilling effect should Item 303 
omissions become actionable. By Item 303’s requirements, man-
agement already exposes itself through affirmative statements 
where investors could argue materiality and reliance.207 While 
companies and management are given a safe harbor period (beyond 
the scope of this Note), assume companies and management are not 
protected by them; investors literally are permitted to bring suit 
on those affirmative statements. If the Court ruled that omis-
sions are permissible to bring causes of action via the materiality 
element, this would undoubtedly dissuade management from 
stating even affirmative statements. Implicitly, the average in-
vestor will assume “if management is not revealing, then they must 
be concealing.” Management’s forward-looking statements will be 
devoid of details, of insight, and even harm innovation. Companies 
might fear that trying new products or inventing new methods will 
spark litigation. And with this, by not disclosing, these companies 
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will “clam up” and actually inhibit growth, something surely the 
markets would not appreciate. 
 For litigation’s sake, it is likely to believe that omissions will 
give rise to more causes of action. While settlements can always 
occur, its concerning to think that by virtue of management’s dis-
cussion of the current affairs of a company, that an investor, 
weary of “missing information” or information that is not discussed, 
but material, does not fare well practically. In a regime that is 
highly regulated, it is quite uncomfortable for management to be 
held accountable for what they do not say. The reason for this is 
simply that to be accountable for the world of possibilities that one 
could say but does not say should not impose liability to broadly 
state every fact in the alternative. For example, imagine a MD&A 
where a company wants to announce the possibility of a merger. 
It could say “we are now planning a merger with Company A.” If a 
suit was brought because management did not say that it was 
100% certain, then the company’s language would change. Perhaps 
something like “we are now planning a merger with Company A, 
but there is always a possibility that the merger will fall through 
because the markets are uncertain, and we wish to disclose the 
possibility that it is not definite.” Notice how the language is not 
only lengthier, but it is also vaguer. But even under a regime 
where a company could be liable, an investor still could bring a 
suit on what management failed to say in even a broad disclosure. 
 Instead, intuitively, it makes more sense, as the law cur-
rently stands, to hold them accountable for what they do say. 
Omissions are challenging because, by definition, it is unclear what 
it includes. Will management have to include all possible and fore-
seeable harm? Will they have to release potential product designs 
that competitors can then get a hold of and then compete at lower 
costs? There are arguably more questions than answers in this 
world where an omission-basis cause of action is adopted. And it 
seems more likely than not that the Supreme Court would err on 
the side of caution and leave this as a matter of agency deference.208 
 Second, management wants to comply with the federal secu-
rities laws. Not only are there threats of criminal sanctions through 
wanton or intentional illegal acts, but the civil sanctions harm a 
firm’s reputation, culture, and can inhibit the firm’s fundamental 
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value. Commonly referred to as the inherent or true value of a share 
of a company, the fundamental value drives firm behavior, among 
other things.209 Scholars in the securities industry have concerned 
themselves greatly with what determines the fundamental value 
or even if it’s even calculable.210 While this Note does not address 
these particularly, there is reason to believe that exposure to liti-
gation will, in some ways, harm the value of a firm. Sharehold-
ers, those who would purportedly bring these private causes of 
action, are actually harmed by way of litigating these omissions. 
It harms the firm’s value and really, their own bottom line. 
 Finally, and perhaps most obviously, Regulation S-K and 
Item 303 are promulgated by the SEC by way of its rule-making 
power prescribed by Congress.211 As a matter of practice and even 
law, it is probably in the best interest of the SEC to ascertain and 
then promulgate whether Item 303 encapsulates omissions as ma-
terial for a cause of action. While the judiciary has ruled by com-
mon law some aspects of the securities industry, it is a highly 
regulated and reviewed industry by the SEC. The regulation is de-
void of any reference to omissions and it is not clear why deference 
should not be afforded to the agency in situations precisely as this. 
CONCLUSION 
 The securities field is nothing short of complex, intricate, and 
ever-changing. The disclosure regime and litigation tactics be-
come even more cumbersome when trying to construe proscriptive 
statutes while simultaneously trying to allocate risk or identify 
cost structures in order to meet disclosure requirements. All in 
all, the securities industry presents challenges today and really, 
every day. 
 Leidos presented a unique opportunity for the Supreme 
Court to answer a straightforward disclosure question. If the 
Court answered in the affirmative—that an omission under Item 
303 did create an actionable fraud claim—litigation costs surely 
would rise, the stock prices would be influenced, and disclosures 
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generally would likely be chilled. On the other hand, answering 
in the negative—that such a duty does not exist—could promote 
certainty, allow firms to allocate risk in their disclosures, and allow 
the market to ascertain which information is valuable. But this 
case also demonstrates key takeaways: how statutory language 
can cause a riff in the circuits; how circuits may construe lan-
guage to create a split; and, perhaps most importantly, how parties 
frame arguments in order to create, or avoid creating, an entirely 
new duty to disclose that would be actionable under Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5. 
 At the very least, this Note seeks to offer an overview of the 
securities authorities at play, the creation of a circuit split, the 
arguments presented by both Petitioner and Respondent, and the 
likely ruling the Supreme Court would have made. Additionally, 
if the Supreme Court had ruled, the impact of such a ruling would 
have been as educational as the ruling itself. The securities dis-
closure regime needs certainty, and Leidos could have provided just 
that. Perhaps a few years from now a similar fact pattern will 
provide the opportunity for the Supreme Court to rule on the 
merits. For now, the existence of a circuit split presents its own 
problems, but that is for another note, for another time. 
 Item 303 and whether an omission from the Management 
Discussion and Analysis constitutes actionable fraud remains 
litigation-ready, where attorneys can present their best arguments 
depending on their circuits. The Second Circuit may be more plain-
tiff friendly, whereas the Ninth may require additional materiality 
to be shown. Nevertheless, this Note hopes to provide clarity in 
the extremely complex world of securities litigation. 
